Introduction
India’s constitutional structure is often described as a quasi-federal system with a strong unitary bias. While federalism implies a division of powers between the Centre and the states, the Constitution of India incorporates certain emergency provisions (Articles 352 to 360) that enable the central government to assume sweeping powers, thereby overriding the federal structure temporarily. These provisions, while necessary for the unity and integrity of the nation, have often sparked debates about their misuse and implications for Indian federalism.
Types of Emergencies in the Indian Constitution
The Indian Constitution envisages three types of emergencies:
1. National Emergency (Article 352)
2. State Emergency or President’s Rule (Article 356)
3. Financial Emergency (Article 360)
Each type significantly alters the balance of power between the Centre and the states.
1. National Emergency (Article 352)
A National Emergency can be proclaimed by the President on the grounds of war, external aggression, or armed rebellion. Once declared, the Centre assumes extensive control over state functions. Parliament is empowered to legislate on matters in the State List, and the tenure of the Lok Sabha can be extended. The federal character virtually disappears as the state machinery comes under the direct influence of the Union government.
Historical Context:
National emergencies were declared in 1962 (Indo-China War), 1971 (Indo-Pak War), and 1975 (internal disturbance). The 1975 Emergency, imposed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, remains one of the most controversial events in Indian constitutional history. It witnessed massive curtailment of civil liberties, press freedom, and judicial independence, highlighting the dangers of central overreach.
2. President’s Rule (Article 356)
Under Article 356, the President can impose President’s Rule in a state if the constitutional machinery breaks down. During this period, the President (on the advice of the Union Council of Ministers) exercises the powers of the state government. This provision has been used over 125 times since Independence.
Concerns and Criticism:
President’s Rule has been frequently misused for political motives. In many instances, the central government has dismissed democratically elected state governments for partisan gains. The most infamous misuse occurred in the 1980s and 1990s when opposition-led state governments were dissolved by the ruling party at the Centre.
Judicial Safeguards:
The Supreme Court’s landmark judgment in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) imposed strict conditions for the use of Article 356. The Court held that the proclamation of President’s Rule is subject to judicial review and that the majority of a state government must be tested on the floor of the legislature, not in the Governor’s report.
3. Financial Emergency (Article 360)
This provision allows the President to declare a Financial Emergency if the financial stability or credit of India is threatened. Though never invoked so far, it has serious implications for federalism. The Centre can issue directions to states regarding financial matters, reduce salaries of government employees, and require the states to reserve money bills for the President’s consideration.
Emergency Provisions and Federalism: A Tension
The emergency provisions clearly tilt the balance of power in favour of the Centre. In normal times, India exhibits federal characteristics with a three-tier government, division of subjects in the Union, State, and Concurrent Lists, and separate legislatures and executives. However, during emergencies, the constitutional framework permits the suspension of federal principles for the sake of national unity.
Arguments in Favor:
Proponents argue that in a diverse country like India, unity and integrity are paramount. Emergencies provide a constitutional mechanism to deal with extraordinary situations. The temporary centralization of power is seen as necessary to protect national interests.
Arguments Against:
Critics argue that such provisions, particularly Article 356, have been disproportionately used and abused. They undermine the autonomy of state governments, weaken democratic accountability, and disrupt the balance envisaged by federalism. The overreach of the Centre, especially during political emergencies, has led to erosion of trust between the Centre and states.
Reforms and Recommendations
Several commissions and expert bodies have recommended reforms to curb the misuse of emergency powers and strengthen federalism:
1. Sarkaria Commission (1983):
Recommended that Article 356 be used only as a last resort and that the Governor’s report must be objective and based on verifiable facts. Suggested a constitutional amendment to regulate the use of emergency powers.
2. Punchhi Commission (2007):
Suggested the incorporation of a provision for prior warning to states before the imposition of President’s Rule. Recommended fixed tenure for Governors and greater transparency in their appointments to avoid politically motivated actions.
3. Judicial Oversight:
The judiciary, especially after the Bommai case, plays a crucial role in safeguarding federalism. Its assertive role in reviewing emergency declarations has acted as a check on the Centre’s powers.
Comparative Perspective
Unlike the U.S., where states are sovereign in many respects and the federal government cannot dissolve state governments, the Indian model permits such central intervention. This reflects the framers’ fear of secessionism and their desire to maintain unity in a country marked by linguistic, religious, and regional diversity.
However, as India matures as a democracy, there is growing demand to re-examine the balance of power and make federalism more robust and cooperative. The Centre must work with states, not over them, to ensure harmonious governance.
Conclusion
Emergency provisions, while essential for dealing with extraordinary situations, pose a serious challenge to India’s federal structure if misused. The experience of the 1975 Emergency and frequent invocation of Article 356 underline the need for restraint, transparency, and robust checks and balances. Strengthening federalism is vital for a truly democratic and inclusive India. The constitutional design must be interpreted in a manner that prioritizes cooperation over control and unity over uniformity.
A mature democracy like India must evolve mechanisms that preserve both the authority of the Union and the autonomy of the states, especially during crises. Safeguarding federalism while maintaining national integrity is the key to India’s constitutional success.
Contributed by: Vanshika Dhiman (Intern)